

The Policy Roots of Ethnic Peace in Tanzania

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Map of Tanzania



Abstract

Tanzania's post-independence politico-economic trajectory is paradigmatic in every major respect except one. In the economic realm, its well-documented decline directly replicated the economic experience of a host of other newly independent African nations. In the political sphere, Tanzania's post-independence trajectory also followed a widespread pattern, as the lively multi-party democracy of the late colonial and early independence periods was replaced by a single party system that maintained itself principally through repressive mechanisms.

In one major respect, however, Tanzania has differed markedly from the majority of African countries; that is, in its culture of ethnic peace. For analytic purposes, the roots of ethnic peace in Tanzania can best be disaggregated into two broad categories. The first can be best identified as "predisposing" factors, the total ensemble of historical and geographical factors that contributed to the emergence of an ethnically peaceful political environment. The second explanatory category views ethnic peace as a socially and politically constructed reality, the product of a set of deliberate and self-conscious policy choices adopted by Tanzania's political leaders in the early years of independence and pursued, for nearly twenty years.

“Several weeks ago, during his campaign as an opposition presidential candidate, John Cheyo committed Tanzania's cardinal sin. Cheyo, who belongs to one of this East African country's largest ethnic groups, urged his Sukuma tribe to become more politically active and hinted that its activism should manifest itself in votes for him. His suggestion brought a blaze of criticism, with opponents accusing him of embracing tribalism for political gain. The candidate abandoned the tactic... [I]n Tanzania, where political leaders and the citizenry have made ethnic peace a top priority, the candidate's words riled the normally placid population as perhaps no other issue could. ‘In our country, just asking someone which tribe he is from will make him suspicious of you,’ said Evarist Maembe, a political activist here in the capital. ‘That is usually not an issue people consider when they deal with each other.’”

Washington Post, November 6, 1995.

Introduction

Tanzania poses a deep conundrum for the ethnic studies approach to African politics. The reason is not simply that ethnicity does not help explain even the most basic aspects of the political system such as party alignments and voter preferences. It is the far more important fact that Tanzania has a political culture that actively discourages the introduction of ethnicity into political discourse.

Tanzania's¹ post-independence politico-economic trajectory is paradigmatic in every major respect but one. In the economic realm, its well-documented decline directly replicated the

economic experience of a host of other newly independent African nations. The early post-independence years were a period of acute economic crisis, as the country suffered an economic decline that resulted in sharply lowered levels of real per capita income. Tanzania's post-independence political trajectory also followed a familiar pattern, as the lively multi-party democracy of the early independence period was replaced by a single party system that maintained itself principally through a host of repressive mechanisms and oppressive laws.² By 1965, Tanzania had become a one-party autocracy. But in respect of the significance of ethnicity in the political sphere, Tanzania has differed markedly from the vast majority of African countries. It possesses a culture of ethnic peace. This very special environment contrasts markedly with the post-independence reality of innumerable African countries, where ethnic animosities sometimes give rise to violent conflicts.

Like the vast majority of African countries, contemporary Tanzania is a highly multi-ethnic society, with approximately 120 distinct ethnic groups and indigenous languages. A major difference between Tanzania and most other multi-ethnic African societies, however, is that ethnicity does not provide the principal basis for political identification and is not, therefore, the organizing principle for its political parties. Tanzanians are aware of ethnicity but it is of limited importance as a basis for the way they form their party preferences, in their expression of support for different political leaders, or, at the most basic level, in the way they make political judgments about one another. Ethnicity is not the defining feature of the social differences between the principal parties, for example, nor does it figure prominently as a basis of individual political affiliation. Tanzanians do not assign ethnic identifiers to their own or others' parties and Tanzanian political parties do not compete with one another by mobilizing different ethnic

constituencies. Tanzania's governing party, the Revolutionary Party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) enjoys broad popular support across the ethnic spectrum.

The political manifestations of Tanzania's culture of ethnic peace are almost palpable. By far the most dramatic, as exemplified in the opening quotation, is the fact that Tanzanians tend to recoil when political leaders try to make appeals based on ethnicity, race or religion. This is not to say that Tanzanian political parties do not have greater strengths in some regions than others or that Tanzanians are unaware of the ethnic or religious background of different party leaders, or even that ethnicity is never a source of political strain. It is to say that Tanzania's political parties are not principally organized along ethnic lines, that the principal divisions between these parties do not spring from ethnic tensions and that for the vast majority of Tanzanians, ethnic identity is not a significant reason for source of or opposition to political leaders. As a result, Tanzania's politics are as remarkable for what has not occurred as for what has. There has been a conspicuous absence of the ethnically driven forms of social conflict that have defined the recent political experience of so many other African countries. In a politically troubled region of the world where ethnicity seems to be at the root of so much social violence, Tanzania stands out for a historical record that is conspicuously absent in the ethnically based conflicts that shape and define the political process in a host of other African nations.

Ethnicity in Tanzania also has low salience in everyday life outside the political realm. It would be an exaggeration to suggest that Tanzanians are unaware of one another's ethnic background. But it is no exaggeration to note that Tanzanians are completely comfortable in personal, social and professional relationships that regularly cross ethnic lines. In their personal friendships, in government and business offices, in occupational and recreational organizations and in the host of casual transactions that form the bulk of everyday life, Tanzanians relate to one

another as if differences in ethnic identity were a matter of no great importance. Tanzanians perceive one another as Tanzanians first and members of an ethnic community second. A revealing example of Tanzania's multi-ethnic culture appeared in a recent blog that described a musical performance at the Bagamoyo School of the Performing Arts.

The celebratory song they played originated with a central coastal ethnic group, the Zaramo. But their teacher was from Tanzania's southern region, near Mtwara on the border with Mozambique. The students, men and women in their mid-20's, came from the capital, Dar Es Salaam, from the western lake area, from all over the country. I talked with one of the students, 26-year-old Victor Mtalemwa Kazinja. But he is also a teacher. When he graduates, he told me, he intends to go back to the school where he taught before coming to Bagamoyo and introduce a younger generation to this kind of music. "When I'm playing traditional music, I'm much enjoying it...because all of us, we are Tanzanian." ¹

Whatever the country's economic and political travails since independence, Tanzania has been a country of ethnic peace. Tanzanians in all regions of the country and in all walks of life are profoundly aware of this fact and attach great value to it.²

To understand this social reality, it is helpful to think in terms of two explanatory categories. The first is factors outside the immediate political realm that have helped pre-dispose

¹ The URL is <http://reporterregrets.blogspot.com/2007/05/interlude-performing-arts-overcoming.html>

² Tanzanian scholars have been especially cognizant of their country's distinctive political culture. See, For example, Mujwahuzi Njunwa, "Local Government Structures for Strengthening Societal Harmony in Tanzania: Some Lessons for Reflection," in Raza Ahmad, ed., *The Role of Public Administration in Building a Harmonious Society* (China National School of Administration, 2005.), and Michael Okema, *Political Culture in Tanzania* (Lewiston, New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1996.)

Tanzania toward a culture of ethnic peace. The second is the contribution to ethnic peace made by the deliberate policy choices of the Tanzanian Government.

I. Predisposing Factors:

1. Swahili Language

Of all the factors commonly cited as predisposing Tanzanians toward ethnic peace, perhaps the most frequently mentioned is the existence of the Swahili language as a lingua franca through which Tanzanians of all ethnic groups can readily communicate with one another.³ It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of this factor: Tanzania is the only multi-ethnic country in Africa with an indigenous lingua franca.⁴ It is commonly understood that Swahili originated as the language of the Indian Ocean slave trade. Its conspicuous mixture of African grammar and vocabulary and Arab vocabulary and everyday idiomatic expressions seems to affirm this fact and language historians commonly state that Swahili first developed as the language of communication between Arab slave merchants and their African intermediaries and victims. Despite its origin as a language of racial domination, Swahili does not carry a taint of ethnic superiority. Tanzanians throughout all regions of the country and in all social strata speak Swahili with pleasure and pride as a genuinely national language that helps knit their country together across ethnic boundaries.⁵

2. Colonial Impacts

The question of whether or not, or to what degree, colonial rule may have had a lingering effect in shaping the political culture of independent African nations has been widely discussed and is far beyond the immediate scope of this research. Suffice it to say here that this question is far more complex for Tanzania than for most African countries because Tanzania had two distinctly different periods of colonial rule. The first was the German period, which began with

the Congress of Berlin in 1885 and ended thirty-three years later with the Treaty of Versailles in 1918. British rule in Tanganyika began at that point and ended with Tanzanian independence in 1961.

It is at least arguable that German colonial practices contributed greatly to reducing the salience of ethnicity in post-colonial Tanganyika. German colonial authorities engaged in a highly centralized form of administrative rule that suppressed indigenous ethnic political systems and exercised complete control from the colonial capital in Dar es Salaam. In the German colonial system, ethnicity, whether in the form of local culture such as language or in the form of local institutions such as traditional authorities and courts was set aside in the interests of a colonial culture that emphasized the exclusive legitimacy of German authority. The essence of the German system was its willingness to suppress local forms of authority in order to superimpose an administrative system that placed complete jurisdiction over people's lives in the hands of the colonial state.

When Britain assumed control of Tanganyika after the First World War, it introduced a system of indirect rule that gave far greater scope and legitimacy to indigenous authority systems. Elsewhere in Africa, this form of colonial rule is often said to have fostered a post-colonial political culture in which ethnicity became highly salient because it preserved and reinforced traditional political units by utilizing them as the basic units of colonial administration. The intriguing question is why this did not take place in Tanzania. One explanation is that by the time the British assumed jurisdiction over Tanzania, two generations of German colonial authority had substantially eroded any notion of ethnicity as a legitimate basis for a separate political identity.

A more persuasive explanation is that the British colonial administration in Tanzania was not as free to utilize ethnicity as the basis of a “divide and rule” strategy as it was elsewhere in Africa. Its colonial practices were significantly limited by the presence of international supervising authorities. Tanzania did not transition from German colony in the pre-World War I period to British colony in the post-war period. It transitioned to a legal status as a ward of the international community. Between 1918 and 1939, Tanganyika was a League of Nations Mandate Territory with Britain as the mandated authority. And, between the end of World War II and independence in 1961, Tanganyika was a United Nations Trusteeship under British jurisdiction. International supervision both between the wars and following World War II meant that every aspect of British administration in the country was subject to continuous monitoring, constraint and review by the League of Nations and the United Nations. Stated most bluntly, the policies of ethnic divide and rule that were prevalent to varying degrees in British colonies elsewhere were sharply limited by the international presence.

It is a major lacuna in the field of Tanzanian studies that practically no one has offered a systematic assessment of the possible effects of the fact that British colonial administration in Tanganyika had to be carried out under the aegis these two international bodies. Aside from one pioneering study by the political scientist Bernard Chidzero, there is not a single book-length study exploring the effects of international monitoring of colonial authority.⁶ Chidzero's study shows that Tanganyika's legal status as a ward of the international community had a number of profoundly important effects on the quality and character of British administration as well as lingering effects on the post-independence Tanzanian environment.

First, there was a wholly different set of expectations about Tanganyika's political trajectory. One was that Tanganyika could not become a European settler colony because a

settler presence might delay the mandated process of evolution toward self-government. Indeed, one of the first acts of the British colonial administration, when it assumed power from the Germans following World War I, was the expulsion of most German settlers. Although other groups of European settlers gradually migrated to Tanganyika between the wars, their numbers were small and their presence was significantly weaker than that of British settlers in Kenya or Rhodesia. The European settlers who resided in Tanganyika were principally the few remaining Germans or settlers from Italy and Greece. Since the European settler community was small, it did not give rise to the sort of land pressures that exacerbated ethnic consciousness in other colonial areas.⁷ Ethnic political mobilization as a means of fending off European land acquisition remained a largely absent feature of Tanganyika's political environment.

3. Geographical Factors

A distinctive political geography may be of equal importance in having facilitated Tanzania's culture of ethnic peace. The most striking feature of Tanzanian geography is the sheer size of the country, approximately 370,000 square miles in size. Tanzania is about one-third the size of India (1.3 million square miles) but with only about one-thirtieth of the population (40 million vs. 1.2 billion). Of utmost significance, however, is the fact that much of Tanzania is possessed of high quality agricultural land. With a relatively small population spread over such a broad land area, Tanzania is definitely a land-abundant and not a land-scarce society. Good quality agricultural land is widely available throughout practically all of the major regions of the country. Although Tanzania is perhaps best known for the rich, coffee-producing region on the south-facing slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro in the north-central area of the country, highly fertile agricultural land is in plentiful supply throughout the north-western, western, southern and coastal regions of the country. Absent any other consideration, the widely dispersed availability

of fertile land would, by itself, provide a powerful explanation for Tanzania's atmosphere of ethnic peace: Tanzania's diverse ethnic groups have not been forced to compete with one another for good agricultural land. As a result, Tanzanians do not automatically divide themselves into land-rich and land-poor ethnic communities, a division that has contributed so greatly to ethnic strain elsewhere.

The second beneficial aspect of Tanzania's natural geographical endowment was the location of the country's major population centers. Tanzania's population distribution could be likened to a sort of giant donut, with the largest concentrations of population located at the perimeters of the country, especially the northern, western and southern borders. There are far fewer people located in the country's center or, aside from urban population centers such as Dar es Salaam, Tanga and Mtwara, along the eastern coast. This unusual pattern of dispersion is not at all surprising; it closely follows the availability of the very best agricultural lands, which are located in north-central Tanzania on the Kenya border, in north-western Tanzania along the border of Uganda and Rwanda, in the south-west border area adjacent to Tanzania's border with the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia and Malawi, and in the southern border area with Mozambique. In Tanzania, the economic incentives created by this geography are unmistakable and powerful: if you want to live on good agricultural land, move to the periphery of the country. The practical political effect was that ethnic groups did not live in such close physical proximity to one another as to generate frictions over land rights.

Tanzania's distinctive geographical environment has also reduced the political influence of the country's largest and most prosperous ethnic groups whose dispersion toward the outer perimeter of the country has made it difficult for them to translate their numbers and resources into a corresponding level of political power. The factor of physical distance - in combination

with Tanzania's notoriously challenging communications and transportation infrastructure – has limited the ability of these groups to use their numbers and economic resources to influence the political process.⁸ At the same time, the ethnic groups that reside near Dar es Salaam have been prevented by their relatively small size and more limited economic resources from taking political advantage of their proximity to the nation's capital. Thus, Tanzania's physical terrain has had a sort of equalizing effect, leveling the playing field between the large and prosperous ethnic communities, on the one hand, and the small and less well off, on the other.

This distinctive geographical pattern has also influenced the socio-ethnic pattern of Dar es Salaam itself, which has developed over time as a genuinely multi-ethnic capital city. During the colonial and independence periods, individual migrants and migrant families from all regions of Tanzania left their ethnic home areas and moved to Dar es Salaam to seek opportunities in the country's mercantile, administrative, trading and industrial sectors. In doing so, they joined the flow of urban immigrants from other areas of the country. Over time, Dar es Salaam came to draw its labor force and middle class from all regions of the country without ever becoming identified with the urban migrants from any one region or ethnic community. Although many of Tanzania's ethnic groups have particular neighborhoods in which they prefer to reside, none have come to view the city as the predominant domicile of any one.⁹ Dar es Salaam is one of Africa's most ethnically neutral cities.

This has been of utmost importance in the evolutionary trajectory of Tanzanian nationalism. The vast majority of nationalist movements in African countries have originated in capital cities where they could draw on such distinctly urban elements as union leaders, teachers, attorneys and various other white collar professionals. This happened in Tanzania as well. But the urban origins of nationalism elsewhere in Africa have also meant that many early nationalist

movements tended to over-represent the ethnic communities that resided in the area immediately surrounding the capital city. Tanzania's experience contrasts sharply with this model. Because Dar es Salaam is such a multi-ethnic city, the urban origins of Tanzanian nationalism did not lead to the formation of a political party composed disproportionately of members of any single ethnic group. Drawing on the ethnically pluralistic population of Dar es Salaam, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) emerged with an ethnic composition that was strikingly pan-Tanzanian. The CCM, its direct successor, has continued this tradition.

In countries where nationalist movements have tended to over-represent the members of one or a small number of ethnic constituencies, this has had a lingering effect on the post-independence pattern of ethnic relationships. Ethnic elements that were able to predominate within the nationalist movement have typically enjoyed a powerful advantage in the competition for social and economic advantage in the post-independence period. They have found themselves in a decisive position to compete for civil service positions in governments that were Africanizing the public sector. And they have also been able to use their political connections to take advantage of opportunities for upward mobility in the professional sphere and in the private sector. Throughout Africa, then, ethnic groups that first gained predominance within their countries' nationalist movements have been able to leverage their position as leading nationalists into a major source of advantage in obtaining elite status in the post-independence public sector. This may well be one of the most important bases of Tanzania's tradition of civil peace: Tanzania's political elite is completely multi-ethnic. As a result, the ethnic identities of Tanzania's political leaders, while known to most citizens, are of no great importance.

4. Cultural Pluralism in Tanzania

Socio-economic inequality between ethnic groups in the form of differential access to elite positions formed the central focus of a group of social scientists who, during the 1960s and 1970s, became part of a school of thought its proponents termed “cultural pluralism.”¹⁰ The cultural pluralists described such situations by using the term “differential incorporation.” This is a situation in which the members of the ethnic groups that comprise a single political system may be disproportionately present – differentially incorporated - in the country’s political and economic elite.

Tanzania has been spared the sort of across-the-board ethnic domination that has given rise to ethnically driven politics in so many societies. This is not to say that significant economic differences and inequalities are absent. Members of Tanzania’s Chagga, Rwa and Haya communities have benefited considerably from their ownership and cultivation of the country’s very best coffee growing lands. Similarly, members of the Hehe community have prospered greatly from the intensive cultivation of the country’s major food staple. And the Sukuma community can be said to have done similarly well in the cotton sector. But this has not carried over into differential access to the political or administrative realms and none of these groups are disproportionately present in the country’s political elite. **Indeed, during the period of socialism in Tanzania, their economic success made them vulnerable targets for a whole set of policies intended to level the country’s economic playing field.**

The presence or absence of such differential incorporation can help explain differences between African societies that are otherwise puzzling. One has to do with widely differing popular reactions to the seemingly all-pervasive problem of corruption. Why does this phenomenon generate a sense of popular outrage in some societies and not others? In particular, why do Tanzanians not react with a greater sense of social rage at this deeply troubling

phenomenon? The simple answer is that the injustice of corruption is not compounded by the injustice of ethnic inequality. Clearly, Tanzanians are deeply uncomfortable with corruption. A national commission chaired by one of Tanzania's most prominent political leaders called upon the government to address it with greater honesty and energy.

Why, then, is corruption not a greater source of ethnic tension or political turmoil in Tanzania? The concept of differential incorporation provides one answer. When the benefits of corruption are disproportionately concentrated within a single ethnic group, they contribute to the perpetuation of that group's differential access to political and economic resources. Generally speaking, however, corruption in Tanzania does not benefit the members of one ethnic group over another. Like so much else, corruption in Tanzania is a non-discriminatory part of the political and social process. For this reason, it has not produced a violent reaction against the political system. In Tanzania, then, even the most dubious feature of the political system operates in a manner that contributes to an atmosphere of ethnic peace.

5. The Variability of Ethnic Identity

Scholars of ethnic politics in Africa and elsewhere frequently fail to assign sufficient importance to the fact that ethnicity is typically a highly variable source of individual identity. No explanation of Tanzania's ethnic peace could be considered even remotely adequate without some deeper consideration of exactly what we mean when we utilize ethnic labels. Ethnicity cannot be understood or described as if it were an unchanging data point in an individual's identity. Sometimes a person's ethnic background can be a strong source of group identity; at other times, not. Numerous factors influence the way individuals may experience, display and decide whether or not to politicize their ethnic background. Ethnicity is not a fixed data point on

the matrix of individual consciousness. Rather, individuals have numerous identities, any one of which might predominate over others depending upon circumstances.

The best point of departure for this discussion is the fact that a person's ethnic identity is only one element in a complex blend of personal identities. The ethnic studies school misses this point altogether. A vitally important feature of ethnic identity in Tanzania and elsewhere is that it is only one aspect of an individual's total ensemble of identities. Thus, a Tanzanian may be a member of a local ethnic community if the issue at hand had to do with claiming a right to a piece of land that is held under some form of traditional ownership; the same individual is likely to identify as a member of a religious denomination if the issue at hand has to do with marriage, funeral services or private schooling. Similarly, if the issue at hand has to do with a strike over wages and working conditions, the very same individual will tend to identify as a member of her or his trade union. Perhaps most importantly, when the dominant political issue had to do with ending colonial rule, Tanzanians have always been, first and foremost, Tanzanians.

What this suggests as a critically important component of Tanzania's social reality is the classic phenomenon of cross-cutting group affiliations. The boundaries of important social organizations in Tanzania repeatedly intersect and sub-divide with one another. Thus, for example, Tanzania's trade unions and religious organizations are consistently multi-ethnic as are its various professional organizations and business groups; Tanzania's ethnic groups are often multi-religious, containing not only differing Christian denominations but members of the Muslim faith. Tanzania's ethnic communities also tend to be highly differentiated socio-economically, containing varying proportions of farmers, trade unionists, artisans and civil servants as well as contributing some members of the country's professional and business elites. The pattern of cross-cutting group ties is so all-pervasive in Tanzania that Tanzanians are

continuously called upon to form bonds of solidarity and mutual identification with individuals of widely differing ethnic and religious backgrounds. When this is so, the idea of an individual's ethnicity as a singular source of on-going conflict or antagonism with other members of the society simply disappears. The puzzling question is not only why this pattern has become so commonplace in Tanzania but why it appears to be so rare elsewhere on the continent.

II. Pro-Active Policies for Ethnic Peace

The newly independent government of Tanzania enjoyed a considerable advantage in having inherited a national language that had been widely diffused by the German system of colonial administration as well as by coastal traders and merchants. Absent any government language policy, therefore, Swahili would undoubtedly have been of some importance in promoting a degree of ethnic peace in Tanzania. Like other historical "if" questions, this is a matter of speculation. The most important fact is that the promotion of ethnic peace became a cornerstone of the post-independence policy framework of the Tanzanian government. Perhaps because Tanzania is better known for having adopted a socialist approach to the management of its economy and perhaps because so many observers view ethnic peace as the fortuitous outcome of favorable geographical and historical factors, this dimension of Tanzania's policy framework has received less academic commentary. It is vitally important, therefore, to understand that the promotion of ethnic peace was as important to Tanzania's early political leaders as the promotion of social equality. And they undertook a series of measures to shore up and build upon the country's inheritance of good ethnic relations. Indeed, policy measures to promote a sense of ethnic unity preceded the policy measure to promote social equality by several years. The government's decision to withdraw the legal standing of traditional chieftaincy, for example, dates to 1962. The common denominator of a number of Tanzanian government policies during

the 1960s was an effort to reduce, if not eliminate altogether, a whole range of institutions and associations that gave prominence and credibility to separate ethnic identities and to replace these with national institutions that treated Tanzanians as members of a single national identity.

1. Language Policy

The first of these was the official adoption of Swahili as the country's national language, which occurred shortly after independence. From 1962, Swahili became the official language of government and education. Although there was a brief discussion, almost entirely in academic circles, as to whether English might have been a better choice because of its readily available scientific vocabulary, Tanzanian leadership clearly understood the political value of a national language not associated with the country's previous colonial power.¹¹ During the decade following independence, the Tanzanian Government aggressively promoted Swahili as a tool of common national identity and gave utmost emphasis to its use as the official language of government and as the language of instruction throughout the country's school system. In doing so, the newly independent Tanzanian government closely resembled the language practice of the German colonial administration in turn of the century Tanganyika.

Since independence, Swahili has provided a significant source of ethnic unity throughout the nationalist and independence periods. During the nationalist period Swahili made it possible for leaders of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) to travel easily across the country, cultivating support for their party among all segments of the population. As a non-European language through which Tanzanians of all ethnic groups could readily communicate with one another, Swahili was a vitally important building block in the construction of an effective and truly national nationalist movement.¹² Since independence, Swahili has made it possible for civil servants and teachers to be posted to any region of the country, and not just the

area where they are familiar with the local language. Swahili may also have a much deeper social meaning for Tanzanians. Lionel Cliffe has suggested that Swahili is the common people's language of Tanzania, and not the socially divisive colonial language of a small, educated elite group.¹³ The colonial languages, English, French and Portuguese do not have the same quality of utilization by members of all social classes. While no observer would go so far as to suggest that a common language alone could bring about ethnic peace, it is difficult to believe that Tanzania's culture of ethnic peace would have been possible without it.

2. Educational Policy and National Service

Educational policy has also played a major role in the Tanzanian government's efforts to foster a culture of ethnic peace. Among the first educational measures of the newly independent state was the nationalization of all private schools. In one dramatic step, this eliminated schools that drew principally from particular religious or racial communities, such as European or Asian (Indo-Pakistani) private schools, schools that catered to particular religious sub-groups such as Lutherans or Anglicans, and schools that catered principally to the more well-to-do ethnic segments of Tanzanian society.¹⁴ All of these schools were made public schools and those schools that had been open only to members of particular racial, ethnic or religious groups were opened to all. Perhaps most importantly, most of Tanzania's secondary schools were made boarding schools so that it would be possible to achieve a high degree of ethnic and religious mixing. In the classroom, on the playing field and in the dormitory, Tanzanian secondary school students mixed and formed enduring friendships with one another across ethnic lines. Some Tanzanians fondly remember the opening of the secondary school year as a time when Tanzania's buses and trains were crowded with students eagerly anticipating the renewal of these friendships, and the end of the school year as a time for sad good-byes. As students formed

friendships across ethnic boundaries, the salience of ethnicity as a potential source of later political strain was diminished. A similar policy was implemented with respect to the assignment of teachers who were assigned to various regions of the country so that the teaching staff of each school would also be ethnically mixed. It is small wonder that Tanzanians today reject politicians who seek to appeal to the ethnic differences between them.

To build further upon the socializing experience of secondary education, the Government also created a system of National Service. Its purpose was also to break down incipient tendencies toward ethnic mistrust. The Government of Tanzania required that, in order to be eligible for government service, all university graduates were required to undergo five months of military training followed by eighteen months in service camps. National Service units were assigned a variety of physically demanding projects including land clearing, road repair, and school construction. Today, many Tanzanians remember their National Service experience very positively, as an opportunity to meet and work together with other Tanzanians under difficult and challenging conditions.

Tanzania's political leaders were profoundly aware of the importance of education as a vehicle for political socialization and they were determined to use the educational curriculum as a vehicle for acculturating Tanzanians in the ethos of ethnic peace. To do so, Government included a major emphasis on national values as part of the curriculum, attaching utmost importance to such themes as national pride, loyalty to the party (not the ethnic group) and the fact that unity and cooperation were the keys to the success of the country's nationalist movement.¹⁵ The core idea of the new curriculum was a simple one: the idea of a Tanzanian nation was of utmost importance and this nation was not a composite of discrete ethnic identities. It had a single identity, the story of one people and their unified determination to attain national

independence from colonial status. Although the idea of a national curriculum was a simple one, it proved to be an effective means of furthering the broader goal, which was to minimize the tendency for Tanzanians to think of themselves as members of discrete (and possibly opposed) ethnic groups. The idea was to encourage students to think of themselves as citizens of a single nation. **3. Electoral Policies and Procedures**

The government's effort to minimize ethnic strains could also be seen in its electoral policies. During the period of single-party rule in Tanzania, the country's electoral system for the National Assembly had several distinctive features. The first was a constitutional stipulation that the party and not the elective offices of the state was the supreme organ of government. According to Tanzanian constitutional doctrine, the National Assembly was a committee of the ruling party. What this meant, in practice, was a requirement that candidates for the presidency and National Assembly would not only need to be members of the party in good standing, but would also need to be approved or chosen by the party before they could stand for elective office. Only then could an individual be popularly elected during the country's period general elections. Since only about one-quarter of the population of the country were party members, even during the single party period, three quarters of the population or more were excluded from eligibility. To become a candidate, an individual was required to subscribe to the strict regulations of the governing party, which included a proscription against appeals to ethnic, racial or religious identity.

The excluded segment included a number of the country's most prominent traditional leaders, including the authority figures of many ethnic communities. During the years immediately following independence, the Tanzanian Government had systematically repealed the policies of the British colonial administration, which – following the principle of indirect rule

- had not only accorded legal standing to traditional authority figures but assigned them certain important juridical and law-keeping functions. Traditional chieftaincy as a legally established and administratively sanctioned institution was eliminated. Not surprisingly, many of these traditional authority figures remained outside the party and a few, over time, even came to be perceived as opposition figures.¹⁶ The symbolic message inherent in the government's measures, however, was clear and powerful: political prominence based on positions of leadership within traditional or ethnically defined communities could not provide either a legitimate or an opportune basis for leadership status within the new nation-state.¹⁷

During the period of one-party rule, elections to the National Assembly were carefully regulated. Much of this effort was intended to see to it that only candidates sympathetic to the party's socialist policy became members of the Assembly. Although candidates for the National Assembly could be nominated locally, final approval of an individual candidacy had to be given by the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the governing party. Needless to say, this requirement brought many factors into play including the emergence of close patron-client political connections between members of the NEC and aspiring candidates.¹⁸ Indeed, widespread criticism of the close ties between NEC members, on the one hand, and members of the National Assembly, on the other, became an important source of impetus for the political reforms of the early 1990s. The major purpose of this requirement, however, was to prevent individuals whose major claim to prominence was local ethnic popularity from rising to national political office or remaining there. And it would only be fair to add that the NEC-approval requirement was vigorously implemented toward that goal.¹⁹ Any number of individuals who seemed to place ethnicity above the country's socialist goals were prevented from running for office and a considerable number of political figures who had successfully run for office,

including a few who had risen to the status of cabinet minister, were prevented from running a second or third time.²⁰

Several other electoral requirements were also intended to lower the saliency of ethnicity in the political process. Thus, for example, candidates were required to use only Swahili while campaigning, and a candidate who used the local vernacular language could be disqualified. Candidates were also strictly forbidden from making appeals for support on an ethnic or religious basis, and a candidate who was found to have done so could also be disqualified. To further underscore the multi-racial and multi-ethnic character of Tanzanian society, the party also took vigorous pro-active steps to see to it that some members of the National Assembly would be elected from districts that were not composed predominantly of members of their particular ethnic community.

Tanzanians are deeply aware of the fragility of a culture of ethnic peace. Tanzanian political leaders and scholars state repeatedly that an environment of ethnic amity does not just happen as if it were a natural event like the rain. They know full well that their very special culture was carefully constructed during the Nyerere era and that it must be continuously reinforced with laws and regulations that will preserve the norms that were set in place by their country's founding fathers. There is no better example of this awareness than the laws that were passed to provide for the country's return to multi-party political competition in 1992. Thus, for example, the Political Parties Act of 1992 (revised 2002) carefully specifies that to be eligible for registration, "a political party must be voluntary and that its membership must be open to all the citizens of the United Republic without discrimination on account of gender, religious belief, race, tribe, ethnic origin, profession or occupation."²¹

Tanzanian law further specifies (Section 8 – 2) that no party can be qualified for registration quality for provisional registration if by its constitution or policy--- it a) aims to advocate or further the interests of – (i) any religious belief or group; (ii) any tribal, ethnic or racial group; or (iii) only a specific area within any part of the United Republic. To enforce compliance with these provisions, Tanzanian law creates a challenging registration procedure whereby a party must clearly demonstrate that it enjoys multi-ethnic popular support. The Political Parties (Registration) Act of 1992 specifies that a party cannot qualify for registration unless it has “obtained not less than two hundred registered members who are qualified to be registered as voters for purpose of Parliamentary elections from each of at least ten Regions of the United Republic out of which at least two Regions are in Tanzania Zanzibar, being one Region each in Zanzibar and Pemba...”²²

These norms are also embedded in the Tanzanian Constitution. Thus, for example, although Tanzanians believe in freedom of speech, they do not believe that this freedom should be extended to individuals or political organizations that are using the privilege to create ethnic or religious animosity. Section 20 of the Tanzanian constitution makes this limitation explicit.²³

20. - (1) Every person is entitled to freedom, subject to the laws of the land, to freely and peaceably assemble, associate and cooperate with other persons, express views publicly, and more specially to form or join associations or organizations formed for the purposes of preserving or furthering his beliefs or interests or any other interests.

(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-article (1) it shall not be lawful for any political entity to be registered which according to its constitution or policy -

(a) aims at promoting or furthering the interests of:

(i) any religious faith or group;

(ii) any tribal group, place of origin, race or gender,

(iii) only a particular area within any part of the United Republic...

The leadership of the CCM went to great lengths to see to it that this law was strictly enforced. Election campaigns were tightly regulated and closely monitored. Candidates were not permitted to use private funds to finance their candidacies; they were required to travel and campaign together, appearing on the same platform and speaking for the approximately same length of time; and each of the two candidates within a constituency was assigned her or his electoral symbol by the party. To enforce the regulation, a special supervisory committee from the party traveled with the candidates to see to it that they complied fully with the electoral rules.²⁴ Candidates who did not could be disqualified.

The authors of the Tanzanian constitution were even more concerned that individuals seeking to generate ethnically based support might attempt to operate outside the party system by declaring individual candidacies for parliament or president. The worst fear of those planning for the country's transition back to multi-partyism was that a general election might degenerate into a kind of unruly free-for-all in which individual candidates appealing to ethnic constituencies would stand for office in opposition to party candidates who were prevented by law from doing so. To prevent this, they wrote into the constitution a requirement that no individual could become a candidate for electoral office except on the nomination of a registered political party.

Without prejudice to any person's right and freedom of expression to hold his own views, to profess a religious faith of his choice, to associate with others and to participate with others in community work in accordance with the laws of the land, no person shall be qualified to be elected to hold the office of President of the United Republic unless he is a member of, and a candidate proposed by, a political party.²⁵

To become a candidate for the presidency, in other words, an individual would need to go through the entire process of forming and registering a political party and then, of securing its nomination to be that party's presidential candidate. The same proscription was also applied to individual parliamentary, who are also constitutionally required to be nominated by registered political parties.²⁶

It would be naïve to suggest that written laws or even the most carefully drafted constitution can create and preserve a political culture. Many of the world's most oppressive dictatorships have had constitutional documents that officially declare a full range of political and personal freedoms. Tanzania is not among these. It has evaded the fatal gap between blueprint and reality. This is because Tanzania's electoral laws and the constitution in which they are embedded are as much an outgrowth of a culture of ethnic peace as an effort to create and preserve it. Tanzanians value political freedom but they also prize a political culture that sets the politicization of ethnicity outside the perimeter of the permissible use of freedom. In Tanzanian political culture, strident appeals to ethnicity or race are given about the same entitlement to freedom of speech as we provide to a person shouting fire in a crowded theater. Tanzanians wrote these restrictions into their laws to insure a value system they had come strongly to believe in, one that would provide a maximum degree of political freedom but would not permit the politicization of ethnic or religious identities.

4. The Symbolic Role of Leadership

Given Tanzania's fortunate inheritance of a number of predisposing factors that helped propel the newly independent country toward a culture of ethnic peace, it is possible that any political leader might have been able to claim credit for the country's distinctive political environment. With very rare exceptions, a political leader's ability to influence the actual course

of events is far more limited than is commonly assumed. For this reason, most political scientists avoid explanations of political processes based on the force of individual personality. That said, an inventory of governmental measures to promote ethnic peace in Tanzania would not be complete without reference to Julius Nyerere's unique impact on a country where he served as principal leader of the nationalist movement, head of the governing party and head of state for nearly 30 years. Nyerere's self-conscious decision to present himself to the Tanzanian people as a relatively benign, socially humanistic and determinedly non-ethnic political leader represents an undeniably personal contribution to Tanzanian culture. His unassailable reputation as a non-corruptible figure of unassuming modesty has further reinforced the value Tanzanians have grown to place on his goal of an ethnically non-differentiated, socially egalitarian society.²⁷

It is undoubtedly true, as Daniel Chirot suggests, that "Nyerere would have been less successful if the existing situation had made a few groups think they could gain power by appealing to ethnic identities."²⁸ But to the extent that it is possible for a single person to be assigned some credit for having an impact on a country's culture, Nyerere would certainly have the highest claim to that credit. Under Nyerere's influence, much of the energy of the Tanzanian nationalist movement and, subsequently, of the Tanzanian Government was devoted to minimizing the presence and role of ethnically based organizations and associations. At the time of Tanzania's independence, there was a wide array of these associations serving a wide variety of social functions. In the rural areas, ethnic organizations were mostly concerned with promoting the development of roads and schools. In the urban areas, there were numerous ethnically organized credit and burial associations, organizations that welcomed and assisted new urban immigrants, ethnic self-help groups, and ethnically constituted recreational and social clubs. Elsewhere in Africa, these sorts of ethnically based associations often became the core

building blocks of rival political parties and were thus an important factor in imparting the taint of ethnicity to the partisan political process.

Tanzania's determination to avoid an ethnically divided political process sets it apart. During the late nationalist period, the leaders of TANU engaged in what can best be termed "jawboning" to convince the leaders and members of these organizations that their best interests lay in merging with the nationalist movement. After independence and especially during the period of single-party rule, there was a more vigorous policy of dismantling these associations. Some of the functions of the ethnic groups were assumed by cross-cutting organizations such as trade unions and agricultural cooperatives. Some ethnic organizations managed to survive but in an adverse cultural climate, their presence barely noticeable in a society where appeals to ethnicity were already considered unpatriotic and un-Tanzanian. Perhaps most importantly, Tanzania's political leaders had created, sometimes forcibly, an environment in which an individual's best prospects for upward mobility did not depend upon mobilizing support from one or another ethnic constituency but, rather, upon becoming a member of the governing party and absorbing its ethos of an ethnically peaceful nation.

The table that follows is intended to provide a capsule summary of the policy factors that have helped promote ethnic peace in Tanzania.

Formative Context	Current Status
Education	
The categories of European, Asian and African schools were abolished as well as Muslim versus Christian schools in favor of primary, secondary, and technical categories.	Liberalization has resulted in de-facto reappearance of these categories under private school auspices.
For secondary school, students were rotated out of their areas of origin and traditional residence to encourage ethnic mingling.	No longer state policy. Rise of private sector schools that may draw upon particular racial or ethnic groups.
Teachers were also recruited and assigned to schools on a rotational basis.	No longer state policy.
Curricular reforms introduced upgraded social cachet for vocational, manual, and applied skills; stress on civic education and cooperative study; learning oriented toward mass pursuits and popular milieu such as rural life.	Priority and prestige afforded elite degrees and higher education.
National Service	
University graduates eligible for government employment required to serve five months in military training followed by eighteen months in national service camps working under hardship conditions that stimulated social bonding.	Discontinued.
Language Policy	
Swahili aggressively promoted as a conscious tool of common national identity; emphasized as a language of instruction, and extolled as a patriotic attribute and the basis of public discourses. Speech deemed	Swahili continues as an indigenous lingua franca; lessened role in favor of

derisive, derogatory, or unduly obsequious inhibited.	English in commercial affairs.
<i>Civic and Cultural Affairs</i>	
Vesting with strong patriotic connotation matters such as styles of dress (for men, collar-less or high-collared suits; for women, long skirts), grooming, diet, flag, anthem and other symbols; de-emphasis on tribal distinctions and content; expressions of hierarchical social status frowned upon; elite/mass social distance officially discouraged and combated.	Waning emphasis on use of cultural policy to promote ethnic amity.
<i>Political Practices</i>	
Exclusively public campaign financing and rule-centered competition (e.g., candidates must campaign together, speak on same platform with preference for communal space as physical sites); speeches must make no appeals based on particularistic identities or themes.	Replaced by ethos of multi-party practices and civil society autonomy.

Countervailing Factors

Some observers have begun to suggest a breakdown in Tanzania's tradition of ethnic peace, citing evidence of ethnic strain along religious lines and in certain regions of the country. It would be misleading to represent Tanzania's culture of ethnic peace as one of complete harmony. Identity politics is a global reality and in at least one significant respect, Tanzania is not an exception. Among Tanzania's Muslims, who may well now constitute 50% or more of the mainland population, there is a deepening sense of exclusion and resentment. Since the early 1990s, there have been a number of incidents, some violent, that reflect a widening divide

between Tanzania's Muslim and Christian communities. The first of these was the so-called "pork riots" of April, 1993, which took place when a Muslim preacher incited his followers to demolish the pork butcheries in Dar es Salaam.²⁹ The strain between Christian and Muslim Tanzanians was further deepened in 1994, when the Government of Zanzibar decided to join the Organization of Islamic States (OIC). The most notable incident of violence took place during a confrontation between Tanzania police and religious leaders at the Mwembechai Mosque in Dar es Salaam in the spring of 1998.

The core of the political strain is a deepening conviction among some members of Tanzania's Muslim community that Muslims have not been afforded the same opportunities for socio-economic advance as members of Christian denominations. The presence of this divide is undeniable. Its root causes, however, have become the source of an intense debate, the terms of which suggest a more long-standing strain between Muslim and Christian Tanzanians.³⁰ Members of Tanzania's Muslim community have articulated a variety of grievances. Some assert that members of their religious community have always been the victims of deliberate discrimination by the country's predominantly Christian elite. Some Muslims also state that the nationalization of the school system was carried out in such a way as to discriminate against Muslim neighborhoods and Muslim children; there is a further perception that the government's insistence on a secular nation-building curriculum in the nationalized public schools prevented them from providing their children with religious instruction. There is further resentment that the educational curriculum set in place during the Nyerere years under-emphasized the important contributions to Tanzanian nationalism made by Muslim nationalists.³¹ Whatever the roots of the difficulty, the fact is that emerging political strain between Muslims and Christians represents a

widening cleavage within a society where identity politics has been conspicuously absent. Some observers fear the possibility of further polarization along religious lines.

There are several factors that may prevent this from taking place. One is the sheer heterogeneity of the Muslim population. Tanzania's Muslims community is both racially heterogeneous and heterogeneous with respect to the presence of a number of sub-communities of the Muslim faith. The population includes not only Muslims of Arab, Asian (Indo-Pakistani) and African descent but members of the Shia Muslim and Sunni Muslim communities as well. It is also of considerable importance that Tanzania's African Muslims, like its Christian sub-groups, are widely distributed across practically all of Tanzania's ethnic communities. Adherence to Islam, in other words, does not markedly differentiate one African ethnic community from another. Of utmost importance, however, is the fact that Muslims have been highly prominent within the highest councils of Tanzania's governing elite. Tanzania has had two Muslim presidents (Ali Hassan Mwinyi and Jakaya Kikwete) and there is a strong Muslim presence in both the most important organs of the governing party, such as the National Executive Committee (NEC) and in the National Assembly. And very early on, the Tanzanian Government created a dialogue vehicle called BAKWATA, which translates roughly as the Grand Council of Tanzanian Muslims, whose purpose was to facilitate better communication between Muslims and the country's political leaders. The result is that a certain amount of the social resentment expressed by Tanzanian Muslims has been directed inward, and expressed as anger against BAKWATA which was perceived as being pro-government, rather than as a unified movement against the Tanzanian state.³² It is also deeply revealing that the CUF party has never gained wide acceptance among mainland Tanzanian Muslims.³³

Perhaps the most enduring basis of ethnic amity in Tanzania has been the uncanny ability of the country's governing party, the Chama Cha Mapindzi (CCM), or Revolutionary Party, to reinvent itself in ways that enable it to maintain widespread popularity as the preferred governing instrument of the vast majority of Tanzanians. By far the most significant, if not surprising outcome of Tanzania's first modern multi-party election, the election of 1995 referenced in the quotation that begins this essay, was the electoral triumph of the country's governing party, the CCM.³⁴ Here, after all, was a political party that had implemented policies resulting in a precipitous economic decline. Its economic approach had produced a country that was financially bankrupt, economically impoverished and utterly dependent on foreign assistance to avert starvation. Here, too, was a party that had maintained itself politically largely through a host of repressive measures such as the constitutional declaration of a one-party state and the use of dozens of oppressive laws. Here, as well, was a party that had sought to implement a widely hated system of collective villages that uprooted millions of Tanzanians from ancestral homes and villages to place them in strange and coercive surroundings. Many Tanzanians also held their governing party responsible for the widespread corruption that had enabled members of the political and administrative elites to enrich themselves beyond the dreams of ordinary Tanzanians. To complicate matters further, the CCM was opposed by nearly a half dozen newly registered organizations that championed differing constitutional and economic policies.

And yet, at the end of the day, the CCM had emerged with nearly 62% of the presidential vote and almost 60% of the parliamentary vote in an election that was widely considered "free and fair" by international observers. In the decade following, the CCM has only increased its electoral dominance, expanding its presidential vote to about 80% of the electorate and its parliamentary vote to about 70% in Tanzania's most recent general election, held in 2005. The

CCM's continued popularity and political dominance in the era of multi-partyism is the great puzzle of Tanzanian politics and scholars of Tanzania will undoubtedly grapple with this issue for many years to come. Central most explanations is the party's uncanny ability to reinvent its identity, transforming its public persona from the party of economic ruin and political autocracy to the party of economic reform and political openness. Other explanations focus on the fact that after nearly 30 years in power, the CCM had developed unmatched organizational and bureaucratic resources. A major source of stability is undoubtedly Tanzanians' acute awareness of the violence and instability that have afflicted so many of its immediate neighbors such as Rwanda, Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo and Kenya. And there is, finally, the factor of sheer political familiarity: better the devil you know than the devil you don't.

The most powerful explanation, however, is the overwhelming popular acceptance of Nyerere's vision of an ethnically harmonious society where people relate to one another as citizens of a unified nation-state, and not as members of ethnically opposed communities. The principal basis of Tanzanians' concern about multi-partyism was that the formation of new parties would bring about a pattern of ethnically based politics. Despite all of the reservations Tanzanians felt about the period of single party CCM rule, and the seemingly universal desire to have greater freedom of political choice, the fear of ethnically based politics was even greater. In the emotions of most Tanzanians, a continuation of CCM rule with all its shortcomings was to be preferred to multi-party choice.

Underpinning all of this the fact that the government works: Tanzania is not a failed state. Despite the all too familiar travails of the development process, the Tanzanian Government works. Schools, hospitals and universities function; the road system is maintained and improved; utilities such as water and electricity are generally available and the communications

infrastructure operates. Whether at the mundane level of urban trash collection or the global level of hospitality to foreign investment and cordial relations with major world powers, the Tanzanian Government carries out the normal responsibilities of government. Against a continent-wide background of failed states, where normal functioning is conspicuous by its absence and where violent civil conflicts have had had devastating long-term effects, the seemingly mundane reality of a functioning society is not taken for granted by Tanzanians. Tanzanians of all ethnic groups and religions consider themselves fortunate to be Tanzanians and in explaining their good fortune to one another, they assign pride of place to their country's culture of ethnic peace.

¹ The country-name Tanzania will be used here throughout. Tanzania was, of course, Tanganyika from the period of colonization through the merger with Zanzibar in April, 1964, at which time the name was changed to reflect the joining of the two countries. This paper concerns itself with the mainland portion of Tanzania as ethnic political realities in Zanzibar differ dramatically.

² These are enumerated in a famous government document, The United Republic of Tanzania, The Presidential Commission on Single Party or Multiparty Presidential System in Tanzania 1991, *Report and Recommendations of the Commission on the Democratic System in Tanzania* (n.p., n.d.). This document is commonly referred to as the Nyalali Commission Report, after its principal author, Chief Justice Francis L. Nyalali. See esp. pp. 165-175.

³ Interestingly, Swahili is itself a multi-ethnic language with a largely African (Bantu) grammar and vocabulary but with a very strong admixture of Arabic vocabulary and idiomatic expressions, and a considerable reliance on words drawn from both German and English.

⁴ It is sometimes observed that Somalia, Botswana and Swaziland basically have a single language. But these are not multi-ethnic societies.

⁵ For a succinct statement of this view, see C. Maganga, "Kiswahili: Language as a Cohesive Factor," in *Tanzania Notes and Records*, No. 83, 1978, pp. 131-132.

⁶ Bernard Chidzero, *Tanganyika and International Trusteeship* (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1961.) This author has always felt that Chidzero's classic contribution has been regrettably under-appreciated by the community of Tanzania scholars. The section that follows owes much to Chidzero's analysis.

⁷ An exception would be the area near Mount Meru, in north-central Tanzania, where land grants to settlers did give rise to political organization and legal action by African residents of the area.

⁸ This is a reference to the widely theorized problem of urban bias in developing countries, the tendency for access to the capital city a major advantage in gaining and wielding political power. The best known work in this genre is Michael Lipton, *Why Poor People Stay Poor: Urban Bias in World Development* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977.)

⁹ Consider the contrast with so many other African capital cities: Nairobi has always been perceived in Kenya as a predominantly Gikuyu city; Kampala, as a Baganda center; Addis Ababa as the urban home of Ethiopia's Amharic population; Khartoum as the epicenter of Sudan's predominant Arab population.

¹⁰ The intellectual high water mark of the cultural pluralism school was probably the publication of *Pluralism in Africa*, edited by Leo Kuper and M.G. Smith. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969).

¹¹ Two excellent articles on this topic are as follows: A. Okion Ojigbo, "Swahili and the Politics of National Integration in Tanzania," in *Bulletin de L'Institut Fondamental D'Afrique Noire*, Vol. 34, No. 3, July, 1972, pp. 525-557, and Lyndon Harries, "Language Policy in Tanzania," in *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, Vol. 39, No. 3, July 1969, pp. 275-280.

¹² Jan, Blommaert, "Language and Nationalism: Comparing Flanders and Tanzania," in *Nations and Nationalism* Vol. 2, no. 2 (1996), p. 235-56.

¹⁴ Brian Cooksey, David Court and Ben Makau, "Education for Self-Reliance," in Joel D. Barkan, ed., *Beyond Capitalism vs. Socialism in Kenya & Tanzania* (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), p. 215.

¹⁵ David Court, "The Education System as a Response to Inequality," in Joel D. Barkan, ed., *Politics and Public Policy in Kenya and Tanzania – Revised Edition* (New York and Philadelphia: Praeger, 1984). See esp. pp. 273ff, section on "Socialization."

¹⁶ One particularly notable example was that of Chief Abdullahi Fundikira III of the Nyamwezi people. An active figure in the nationalist movement, Fundikira became a member of the Tanzanian cabinet immediately following independence. With the imminent passage of legislation legalizing the one-party state, Fundikira resigned from the cabinet in 1963, and then from the civil service. He later became one of the first leaders of the movement to restore multi-partyism, helping to form a party called the National Committee for Constitutional Reform (NCCR).

¹⁷ For an excellent account of how this took place, see Judith Listowell, *The Making of Tanganyika* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1968), pp. 320-322.

¹⁸ Nyalali Commission Report, pp. 50-51.

¹⁹ For one authoritative statement on this point, see Goran Hyden, "Party, State, and Civil Society: Control Versus Openness," in Joel D. Barkan, ed., *Beyond vs. Socialism in Kenya & Tanzania* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), p. 83.

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- ²⁰ William Tordoff has stated that in the first single-party election held according to these rules, the party disqualified three junior ministers and nine back-benchers. See his article, "Tanzania: Democracy and the One-Party State," in *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 2, Issue 4, 1967, p. 605.
- ²¹ The Political Parties Act 2002, Section 8-1-C. This law can be found on-line at the following URL, <http://www.tanzania.go.tz/pdf/Political%20Parties%20Act%205.pdf>
- ²² Political Parties (Registration) Regulations, 1992, Regulation 4. This law can be found on-line at the following URL, <http://www.tanzania.go.tz/pdf/Political%20Parties%20Regulations.pdf>.
- ²³ The Constitution of Tanzania, Section 20. This document can be found on-line at the following URL, <http://www.kituoachakatiba.co.ug/TanzaniaConstitution.pdf>.
- ²⁴ Goran Hyden and Colin Leys, "Elections and Politics in Single-Party Systems: The Case of Kenya and Tanzania," in *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Oct., 1972), See esp. pp. 408ff.
- ²⁵ Constitution of Tanzania, Article 39, Section 2.
- ²⁶ Constitution of Tanzania, Part II, Members, Constituencies and Election of Members, Section 67-1-b.
- ²⁷ Nyerere maintained the use of symbolic messaging to the very end of his presidency. At the official ceremony for the handing over of power to his successor, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, Nyerere entered the stadium in the presidential limousine, but exited in a private Volkswagen.
- ²⁸ Daniel Chirot, "Introduction," in Daniel Chirot and Martin E. P. Seligman, eds., *Ethnopolitical Warfare: Causes, Consequences and Possible Solutions* (Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association), p. 3.
- ²⁹ This event is discussed in more detail in John Campbell, "Nationalism, ethnicity and religion: fundamental conflicts and the politics of identity in Tanzania," in *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1995. See esp. p. 112-113.
- ³⁰ For an excellent article on Tanzania's growing Muslim-Christian divide, see Bruce E. Heilman and Paul J. Kaiser, "Religion, Identity and Politics in Tanzania," in *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 23, No. 4, 2002, pp. 691-709.
- ³¹ A catalyst for much of this feeling was the publication in 1998 of Mohamed Said's book, *The Life and Times of Abdulwahid Sykes (1924-1968): The Untold Story of the Muslim Struggle against British Colonialism in Tanganyika*. (London: Minerva Press, 1998).

³² In the early 1990s, some of the more radicalized Muslims formed a rival organization, BALUKTA, which translates roughly as the organization for the promotion of the Koran. BALUKTA lost its legal registration in 1993.

³³ This may have to do with the fact that CUF is widely perceived, among both Muslim and Christian Tanzanians as an outgrowth of Zanzibar politics and, therefore, as a vehicle for extending Zanzibar influence onto the mainland.

³⁴ For an extensive discussion of Tanzania's first multi-party general election, that of 1995, see Oda van Cranenburgh, "Tanzania's 1995 Multi-Party Elections: The Emerging Party System," in *Party Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 4, 1996, pp. 535-547.