Nationalism and the Politics of Language:
Analogies from Europe for the Pacific Basin

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This essay is an exploration of nationalism and language in contemporary times. The largest question here is the question of the value of nationalism rooted in language. Is it a good thing, and should we try to cultivate it, or is it a bad thing that we should try to discourage? It may be a good thing because it may help balance cultural persistence and change in the face of globalization. It may be a bad thing because it may provoke violence and chaos.

If the European experience is any guide, the Pacific basin will be facing major controversies over language in the coming decades. As they become wealthier and enter more deeply into the modern world, the linguistic minorities in all of these countries may be expected to claim more rights. The west coast of South America has already seen a political resurgence of Aymara and Quechua speakers in Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia. Indonesia contains speakers of 550 languages, with over a million speakers of 15 of them; the Philippines has 171 languages, with over a million speaking 13 of them. The big one, of course, is China, with at least 59 language groups in seven families. More than half of them (850 million) speak Mandarin, but 90 million speak Wu and 70 million speak each of Min and Cantonese. In addition to these larger groups, the government asserts that 22 ethnic minorities have 28 written languages. By European standards, there are rebellions and wars waiting to break out here.
This essay begins from an exploration of some of the relatively recent European experience, looking for analogies and patterns that may emerge in the Pacific basin. Like all comparative work, the reader will have to make some imaginative leaps along with some allowances for differences and disanalogies.

As a preliminary observation, it may well be that it is not something that we have much control over, because languages do not seem very responsive to deliberate control. Although languages do come and go according to a dynamics that we do not understand too well, deliberate efforts to eradicate a language, short of genocide, often seem to have the perverse effect of encouraging it. So we may expect a multiplicity of languages to persist for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, even within narrow limits, public policies probably can have some effect on the growth or diminution of language-based nationalism. So, should such policies encourage or discourage it?

As another preliminary clarification, this essay will focus on language nationalism. Nationalism is often a combustible combination of religious, ethnic, linguistic, and other identities. Well-known cases such as Tibet combine all of these factors to stimulate opposition to Chinese rule. But linguistic nationalism can go it alone. In many of the European cases which shall be discussed below, there is no significant religious or ethnic difference between contending groups, only the language difference. Wherever it is a factor, the effort should be made to differentiate the dynamics of language nationalism from ethnic and religious nationalism.³

On the one hand, there has always been a tendency toward international dominance of a single language. In Catholic Europe of half a millennium ago, it was Latin. That was replaced by French as a literary and diplomatic language across wide swaths of Europe. It is
no secret that English is now the international business and academic language. All of higher education in Finland, and some of higher education in the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany, Italy, and other countries is now conducted in English. There may soon be more Chinese English-speakers than there are British or American English-speakers. What will this mean for language nationalism? No one really knows.

The famous German philosopher Immanuel Kant originally thought that world-wide unity and peace would come from a “universal cosmopolitan existence”, which might have meant the spread of one government, language, and religion to all corners of the earth. But he soon back-tracked, and called that possibility one-dimensional and stifling, even a “universal despotism which saps man’s energies and ends in the graveyard of freedom”. Rather, he then postulated, a never-to-be-eliminated variety of languages and religions in healthy competition would be more likely to lead to progress and freedom.

It is not always appreciated that a writer we think of as a Frenchman, Michel de Montaigne, thought of himself as a Gascon, a name taken from his region, Gascony, which also spoke a noticeably different language, Gascon. In his day in the sixteenth century, Latin was the unifying and cosmopolitan language, used by most sophisticated writers, and his father taught him that language as a child. Even the Bible had only very recently been translated into vernacular languages of everyday use. But that set off the escalating growth of the vernacular languages, exemplified by Montaigne’s Essays. He did not use Gascon in his writings, but rather French, which would give him access to a much larger readership. Similarly, two centuries later, another philosopher, David Hume, was a Scot who tried to eradicate Scotticisms from his use of the English language. He wanted to play in the bigger pond of English as a literary language with far more readers than Scottish.
Will intellectuals from the Pacific basin stick with the widespread languages of Mandarin, English, and Spanish, or will they try to validate and reinforce a more local language? For every David Hume there was a Robert Burns, who developed Scottish into a literary language by providing the songs and poetry that could make it one.

An older nationalism was associated with the nation-state, beginning for our purposes with the eighteenth century. European wars played an important role in assimilating Gascons and Normans and Provencals into Frenchmen, and people from hundreds of small and medium-sized bishoprics and dukedoms into Germans. In the twentieth century, radio and television played a major role in standardizing national languages, not least in the United States. This pattern has been followed in Asia, too. But after lifting the prohibition on the Formosan (i.e., local Taiwanese) language in Taiwanese television and radio in 1996, that native language jumped to 40 per cent of usage of the airwaves.

This last fact represents the newer nationalism, based on local languages. This has entailed the reinvention, if necessary, of Basque, Gaelic, Catalan and other languages that had either fallen into decline or been driven there by massive repression. Basque has been brought back by legal establishment and subsidy; Irish or Gaelic is required in schools and for civil service jobs, although almost no one speaks it as a native or primary language. The first Catalan Language Congress was held in 1906, and the first chair in Catalan language and literature was established at the University of Barcelona only in 1961. But now Catalonia is on the brink of declaring its independence. All of this is the product of political intervention as mostly oral languages were developed or rediscovered as written languages by officials and intellectuals, not by spontaneous acts of the people. A lesson for the Pacific Basin nations is that this sort of reinvention might be part of their future.
A key factor and almost co-extensive with all language nationalism is perceived injustice or oppression. The Basques, Irish, and Catalans just mentioned all tell their stories of repression and humiliation. The speakers of Aymara and Quechua in South America claim that they have been subjected to repression and second-class status for 500 years; the Maya can say the same in Central America. Tibetans may claim interference for only 200 years, and other resentments may date back only 50 or 100 years. But wherever speakers of one language are privileged over others in educational opportunities, employment, and social and political life, resentments and reactive nationalism will be created. It is useful to distinguish two broad categories here: material economic and political injustices, and perceived social and psychological humiliations, which provoke what is known as the “politics of recognition”.

It seems likely that the only way to prevent language nationalism based on perceived injustice would be to develop a true equality along all economic and social dimensions among the speakers of any two or more contending languages. Whether this has ever been the case is an open question. To take only one example, in the spirit of multi-lingualism a friend of mine from the German-speaking part of Switzerland (St. Gallen) chose to attend university in the French-speaking part (Geneva). He was told by a friendly professor that he would never, ever get the highest possible grade because his slight accent and occasional imperfections in French would prevent him from being perceived as the crème de la crème.

Was my colleague resentful of this inequality? Not really. In another discussion, he and others explained to me that federal appointments in Switzerland are apportioned among four categories: French-speaking Catholics, French-Speaking Protestants, German-speaking Catholics, and German-speaking Protestants (note that the Italian speakers are left out of
appointments at this level). The best-qualified might be passed over for a representative of one of the other communities. But the Swiss explained that this was just part of the price of getting along. Will the countries of the Pacific Basin accept this form of distribution of jobs and power by language group?

The Swiss case is an example of structural inequality at the highest levels of wealth and culture. One reason it works in Switzerland is that most jobs are appointed at the regional or cantonal level, not at the federal level, so if you are passed over for a federal job, you can just go home to a cantonal job. Language-based privileges or quotas will presumably create less resentment in such a decentralized federal system. But one can imagine that they would play out with much more divisive implications at lower levels of less-wealthy communities, and in more centralized countries where there are fewer alternative sources of jobs and power. As great structural changes coming from globalization are added to language-based perceived inequalities, tensions may mount.

As long as all of the people who are speaking a common language as a second language are really speaking it as a second language, there will be a kind of equality. No one will lose anything because they are not speaking it perfectly. But when Europeans perceive that English people or Americans are getting special privileges because they speak English like a native, the non-natives will begin to resent it. Only 17 million of the 200+ million Indonesians speak the national language of Indonesian as a first language. If they obtain privileges for their fluency, we can expect resentment from the speakers of Indonesian as a second language. If in addition they lose even more because they are non-native in their speaking of English as the language of transnational trade, their resentments may be compounded.
In addition to the Swiss case, there are cases where language imperfection can be overridden as a status marker by expertise. American universities hire many foreigners for their scientific skills and knowledge, even despite their lack of language proficiency. But again, this is an elite level; it rarely plays out that way at lower levels of society, where accent can be a roadblock to professional advancement. As more and more people move around the world in response to economic change, this may lead to more resentment.

This leads us to our next question: Can the resurgence of local languages counterbalance and mitigate the strains of transnational integration? Or does it add to them?

There is a model of spontaneous harmony that would answer the first question with a “yes”. Hegel’s theory of a thesis followed by the spontaneous emergence of an antithesis and then a synthesis would predict that if transnational integration creates strains, something will emerge that will soften and alleviate those strains. Another analogy is the self-organization of contemporary chaos theory. On these analogies, the resurgence of local languages could be interpreted as a natural and healthy counter-balance, helping people to adjust to the overwhelming impact of globalization. On this intuitively understandable model, local languages give us roots that help us remain anchored as the tides of globalization wash over us.

But there is an equally intuitive case for answering “yes” to the second question. If one side of us is pulled toward the bigger world of globalization, and the other side is pulled toward an ever-more-local sub-national group, is there no danger that we will be pulled apart? All of these local languages may provide comfort, pride, and local identity, reinforcing our self-esteem, but they may also inspire exclusion and violence. As the strains of
transnational integration grow too strong, we may snap and reject it and seek refuge in the local.

An important case in point in Europe is the Basques, a separate linguistic group in the north of Spain as well as in Southwestern France. Basque is almost totally different from Castilian Spanish, the dominant language of Spain, and not related to any other nearby language. The first printed book in Basque was published in 1545, but Basque literature was never abundant, and consisted mostly of religious texts. Under the dictator Francisco Franco, who ruled from 1936 to 1975, public use of Basque was suppressed. Basque nationalism turned violent, leading to bombings and assassinations that have still not ceased. Nationalist politicians appeal to pride in the language and a separate identity, even though the language is only spoken as a first language in some of the smaller rural villages.

Several factors make Basque pride work. One is that although the merchant class might want to suppress the violence if it hurt business, it does not. The inland valleys of Basque country have a high population density, and the means to afford a summer vacation on the coast—foreign tourists are not needed, making the large summer resort business along the Basque coast relatively immune from the poor reputation that Basque separatist violence creates abroad. Basques themselves are used to the violence, which is usually directed only against the police and officials, and therefore the merchants do not need to attract foreigners.

The University of the Basque Country in Bilbao is a bi-lingual university. The weaker students, I was told, have been flocking to classes held in Basque. “Why?” I asked. Classes in many subjects cannot assign readings in Basque because they do not exist. So students know that in classes on the same subject in Spanish they will be expected to read books and attend lecture, whereas the Basque classes only require attendance at lecture. Exam questions
cannot come from anything but the lectures. So the classes are easier. “Ahh,” I asked, “but if employers know that one has studied in Basque and therefore read less, won’t that degree make it harder for the student to get a job?” The answer is “no”, because the diplomas do not reveal whether the classes were taken in Spanish or Basque. So the Basque linguistic nationalists are not wholly transparent about it.

The Basque country is not just caught between Basque and Spanish. Out in the streets, bus stops and subways are full of advertisements for English classes, locally and abroad. “Give your children a future”, they say, “Help them learn English”. Send them to English classes here, and send them abroad to England. Basque nationalists know that they cannot get along in the modern world with only Basque, but it feeds their wounded pride to assert that their second language will be English, not Castilian. The origin of Basque nationalism was a perceived lack of respect from the Spanish-speakers. There is reason to suspect that they will not receive much more respect for their language from English-speakers, yet whether this is relevant remains to be seen.

Something similar can be said for Valencia, also in Spain. Valencia has its own language, Valenciano. Avid defenders of this language insist that Castilian Spanish is a foreign language, and should be accorded secondary status. Laws have been passed giving hiring priority in some jobs to Valencian speakers. But Valencians are also jealous of Catalan, the language spoken just to the north, in the region centered around Barcelona. Both of these languages are Romance languages, like Italian and French, and not mutually intelligible to Spanish-speakers without study. But they are mutually intelligible to each other. Just a few years ago, the Valencian Academy of the Language made a study of the
matter and issued a report concluding that Valencian was linguistically the same as Catalan. The Valencian nationalists were outraged, because they very much wanted to be different and have a separate identity from their neighbors to the north, as much as from their neighbors to the west in Madrid. One of the first things they tell foreign visitors is that 500 years ago Valencia was a much more important city than Barcelona.

Basque activists note that more and more people in the Basque country and neighboring Navarra are signing up for Basque classes, and suggest that this is the voice of the people. Similarly, nationalistic Valencians note with pride that more and more people are signing up for Valencian classes, and sending their children to Valencian-speaking kindergartens. They also want to understand this as popular demand. Yet I met at least one Valencian who did not speak Valencian and explicitly said he was an anti-nationalist, but sent his daughter to a Valencian school because he wanted to make sure she would not be deprived of job opportunities and treated as a foreigner in her home city. It was fear rather than curiosity and an expansive view of culture that motivated him. This is a mirror image of the perceived injustice and humiliation that spurred the resurgence of Valencian in the first place.

Meanwhile, European identity and job opportunities from knowing English are influencing Valencia as much as the Basque Country. No one was flustered when I asked a group why they were worrying so much about which of Castilian, Valencian, or Catalan had priority if their grandchildren were going to speak English. Like the Basques, they saw English as an opportunity, not a symbol of oppression or lack of respect like Castilian and Catalan.
When I mentioned this to a sociologist who has studied nationalism in both Finland and Valencia, he answered that much of Europe now lives by bi-lingualism. The Finns do not feel inferior because they have to use English at work. They did not develop Nokia into a billion-dollar company by insisting on doing business in Finnish. Instead, they adopted English as a business and school language. But that did not make them forget Finnish. It is still the language of home, and the Finns are even more fiercely nationalistic than the Valencians, my sociologist told me. The overall lesson here us that much of the world might well be bilingual in the future. In linguistics, this is known as diglossia. Where it is already the case, as in much of China, Indonesia, and the Philippines, the power relations of the two or more languages may still be renegotiated.

Barcelona resents Madrid as much as the Basque country and Valencia do. Catalonia has made most of the steps necessary for regional independence from Madrid. Job opportunities are often contingent upon learning Catalan. Barcelona is also the home of growing numbers of immigrants, who are faced with the double challenge of learning two languages, Catalan and Castilian Spanish. For the sake of the opportunities, many do. There are now whole neighborhoods of Moroccans, of Sikhs, of Romanians, and several more immigrant groups. When I asked if this sort of segregation of immigrant groups might lead to riots of the sort experienced in France a few years ago, the answer was “Not for ten or twenty years”. The French unrest was not based on language as much as on religion and ghettoization. But it will be interesting to see if the countries of the Pacific basin take this attitude toward resurgent language nationalism. Putting off thinking about it has the benefit of not drawing attention to it. But it also has the cost of not leading to the taking of any proactive ameliorative steps.
Offshore in the Mediterranean, the island of Mallorca faces a similar quandary. Nationalists there also want to distance themselves from Barcelona, and claim that Mallorcan is a separate language from Catalan, even though they are closely related. Intellectuals make a living translating all sorts of literature from Spanish or Catalan to Mallorcan. This is not market-driven, but rather heavily subsidized by the government and nationalist parties. Teachers, translators, editors, publishers, and broadcasters make up a lobby that will continue to push the claims of the local language as long as their jobs depend upon them.

The northwestern corner of Spain is called Galicia, and in the countryside the people also speak their own language, Gallego. In recent years, nationalist legislation has required classes in that language and given employment priority to Gallego-speakers, even in the cities. Gallego is very close to Portuguese. Does that mean the Gallegos would like to spin off from Spain and join Portugal? Absolutely not. Here we have a replay of the Belgian situation. The Flemish-speakers of Belgium do not want to join the Netherlands, even though their languages are similar, and the French-speaking Walloons of Belgium do not want to join France, mainly because they would be treated as the little sisters of those larger countries. The Gallegos know that they would be the little sisters in a greater Portugal, possibly treated with even less respect by Lisbon than they are by Madrid.

The most recent news out of Belgium is a plan to split the country up by language into three independent parts, Flanders, Wallonia, and the multi-lingual city of Brussels. The theory is that if Luxemburg, which is right alongside as a demonstration, can go it alone under the umbrella of the European Union, then so can these three units. The case of Spain is instructive because here is one medium-sized country with at least five fairly ambitious separatist language groups claiming and often obtaining regional independence, much of that
only within the last thirty years. No one really knows what it might come to. As long as the peninsula is under the umbrella of the European Union, there may be no strong incentive to keep it together. Spain could be divided up into half a dozen or more Luxemburgs.

Are the countries of the Pacific basin ready for this alternative? Could a large country like China serve the same purpose as the European Union does in justifying a proliferation of language-based Luxemburgs? If the international language of the European Union is English, the international language of the Chinese Union could be Mandarin Chinese, while numerous language-based regions separate under its umbrella. There are at least two possible paths here: one is for the central government in China to try to maintain full central power and Mandarin as the only official language for many purposes, somewhat on the model of the United States. The other is for the central government to manage devolution of the various linguistic regions into a federal patch-work like Europe.

I note that Europe did not adopt a name that expresses what they have, but that had already been taken for other purposes: The English-Speaking Union. I also imagine that the people who speak the other languages in China might not appreciate calling themselves The Mandarin-Speaking Union. Most Europeans could agree on “European Union”, tacitly English-speaking; will Asians agree on a Mandarin-speaking “Asian Union”?

Some of these language regeneration patterns are repeated throughout Europe. As already mentioned, Gaelic had been suppressed for many years in Ireland, where it is now taught in schools. But that does not make it a living language, except in a few smaller villages. Most people know it only from school and street signs. Norway has required its students to learn old Norse, not a living language, for many years. But no one actually uses it.
These are expensive measures, in terms of time and money and opportunity costs, which may be worth it for the sake of national pride in the richer nations. But can all of the countries of the Pacific basin afford this sort of thing?

Does local-language labeling of foreign practices make them less foreign? Iceland has a board of experts who invent linguistically Icelandic names for foreign inventions. Instead of calling computers some variation on “komputors”, they create artificial words based on ancient language roots: in this case, “tölva” ( = tölur [numbers] + -va [word ending of prophetess]). With a population of only a quarter of a million, and very little immigration, this might catch on. But in all of the rest of Europe foreign names are quickly assimilated into normal usage. The countries of the Pacific basin will have to decide whether to try to create neologisms that might have a softening affect on the foreignness of foreign ideas and products, or to give the foreign words and practices a positive connotation that eliminates the need to worry about their foreignness. The latter would appear to be less expensive, if not always possible.

Quebec, Canada provides some relevant experience as an overseas development of European culture. A French-speaking majority spent two centuries under English-language political domination until a resurgence of French-speaking nationalist power brought them close to independence from Canada twice in failed referendums of 1980 and 1995. The first rule of language policing in Quebec, in 1974, required that all signs include French translations if they contained English. For a brief period, a native speaker of one language could learn the other relatively easily from signage. But then, in 1977, the nationalists required that the English be removed, and all signs be in French only. Once the nationalist
principle that the government should regulate language usage is accepted, it is easy to take it step by step toward exclusion. There may be a lesson here for the Pacific basin: expect “mission creep”.

Eminent philosopher Charles Taylor approves of French-language nationalism in Quebec. Of Quebecois francophone heritage, he has nevertheless thrived in the English-speaking university ambiances of Harvard and Oxford, England. His children are bi-lingual or multi-lingual. And yet he has argued in favor of the laws which prohibit French-speakers in Quebec from sending their children to English-language public schools, because, as he says, he wants there to be a French-speaking culture in North America for his children to enjoy. As he puts it, beyond “having the French language available for those who might choose it”, we must make “sure that there is a community of people here in the future who will want to avail itself of the opportunity” by actively seeking “to create members of the community”. So French-speakers who might want their children to be able to compete in the continental and international English-language world are deprived of that freedom in order to benefit his children and his feeling for the culture that might be lost.

In an attempt to mollify the Quebecois and keep them in the country by showing them that they really are part of Canada, the rest of Canada has passed language laws, too. Highway signs must be in both languages. But there are tell-tale signs that some people do this grudgingly. Where a perfectly good translation of “Fish Lake” might be “Lac du poisson”, I have seen a bi-lingual sign read “Lac du fish”. Technically, they could be treating “Fish” as a proper name, and thus not translatable. But it looks like they are none too enthusiastic about the translation requirement. The countries of the Pacific basin may expect such reactions, too.
Meanwhile, the French celebrated francophone nationalism in Quebec, but the sword of language nationalism has also cut against them. For a long time the Basque-speaking southwest of France remained dormant, largely because the French gave refuge and support to Basque separatists from Spain. But now the Basques are referring to southwest France as “the Northern Basque Country”, and working to obtain government funding for language schools there. Activists promote “the concept of language planning, which was brought to us from Quebec” to make their case for funding for the renaissance of the language.\(^\text{12}\) One suspects that Paris is not celebrating these developments.

“Language planning” is bureaucratic language for state intervention in language use and development. It almost always means subsidies and privileges for use of particular languages. That means, of course, that many people will not want to provide such subsidies and privileges for people who use other languages. So the apex of European language planning legislation so far, the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, has not been very successful. This is partly because it does not have teeth: it amounts to a declaration of good intentions. It celebrates diversity and cultural wealth, but its Preamble stresses that the “encouragement of regional or minority languages should not be to the detriment of the official languages and the need to learn them”, and should be conducted “within the framework of national sovereignty and territorial integrity”.\(^\text{13}\) Without these limits, it would practically invite separatism. Spain has ratified the charter, perhaps mollified by these phrases. But the Basques, Catalans, and others really do mean to diminish the official language and change sovereignty and territorial integrity. France has not ratified, perhaps because people cannot believe that the opening wedge of legal justification of government subsidy for minority languages will not eventually lead to separatism.
It is sometimes said that the great divides are religion and color-based ethnicity or “race”, not language. But several of the European cases we have discussed are language-based only, with no differences of religion or color. This is a matter that cross-cuts politics in many ways. In the Spanish case, for example, both left and right are united in their opposition to language-based separatism. Most dramatically, in the time of the civil war in the 1930’s some of the leftists and constitutionalists who opposed Francisco Franco’s right-wing take-over of the Republic went as far as to say they would prefer Franco’s victory to secession by Catalonia. I think we can expect similarly stubborn opposition to any moves in the direction of separatism by language minorities in the Pacific Basin.

The grand alternative to linguistic nationalism might be cosmopolitanism. This was a neologism of the ancient cynic, Diogenes, who called himself a citizen of the world. When exiled for malfeasance from his hometown of Sinope, he answered that he condemned his own people to staying home in Sinope, while he was on his way to Athens, the great cosmopolitan center of the time. He did not have to cross linguistic boundaries to do so, however, and that is perhaps what makes it more difficult for later people and peoples to embrace cosmopolitanism. Languages make foreignness immediately obvious, and put the non-native speaker at a disadvantage wherever linguistic nationalism makes native-speaking the standard. It is this latter that is the crux of the problem. If native versus non-native usage of language is made to be important through favoritism and discrimination, people will be driven to identify with and defend their native languages.
Throughout this chapter, I have tried to draw attention to the implications for the Pacific Basin. If I may summarize them in less nuanced terms, they go like this. East Asia and Pacific-coast Latin America have not yet had the language nationalism and irredentism that Europe has had on the scale that Europe has had it. But that does not mean they may not ever have it. Rather, I would expect that as they get richer and more integrated into worldwide communication, education, transportation, and trade networks, they will be more likely to have it. Sometimes in order to join those networks, and sometimes in reaction against them, people will turn to English and to local languages and against the languages of the established central governments. Those governments can try to suppress these movements, or they can try to manage them. The latter may be able to harness them in productive ways, and help to prevent violence and chaos. The former may not work.

It bears repeating that there is no reason to believe that the nations of the Pacific Basin must inevitably follow the patterns of European language nationalism. But the European experience may serve as a warning and a set of possible responses to present and future Pacific Basin problems.

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Too many studies risk missing language nationalism by, for example, providing only maps of ethnic groups. See, e.g., S. H. Donald and R. Benewick, *The State of China Atlas*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005. This misses the importance of language differences among members of the same ethnic group.


Kant, “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch” (1795), *Political Writings*, pp. 113-4.


In his response to Taylor in *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition*, Anthony Appiah complains that this usage of government power to force other people to create a world that will benefit one’s own children “steps over a boundary” (p. 163).
